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INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME II
(The Use of Force, Human Rights and
General International Legal Issues)

hy
Richard B. Lillich*
As my Brother Moore rightly suggests in his Introduction to Volume
I, "some of the best writing on international law has appeared in the
Naval War College Review." I need add only that "some of the best" of
this "best writing" has been on the not unrelated subjects of the use of
force and international human rights, the two areas upon which most of
the contributions to this volume focus. Writing an Introduction to such
a remarkable collection of articles presents an editor with two principal
alternatives. Either he surveys the various contributions in "once-overlightly" fashion-stressing their originality, taking issue with an occasional fine point, and attempting throughout to whet the reader's
appetite for the intellectual fare to follow-or he ignores them entirely
and produces an independent piece of scholarship on some topic
supposedly of compelling interest. Actually, I intend to borrow a bit
from both approaches, taking the views of the various contributors on
two specific points-forcible self-help to protect nationals abroad and
the impact of international human rights norms upon the U.S. foreign
policy process-and weaving them with some of my own views into
what hopefully will be an interesting, if not necessarily an avant garde,
pattern.

Forcible Self-Help to Protect Nationals Ahroad

Under the UN Charter, as Admiral Miller points out, member states
foreswore the unilateral use of force in international relations save in
*Howard W. Smith Professor of Law, University of Virginia, and President,
Procedural Aspects of International Law Institute .. Sometime Charles H. Stockton
Chair of International Law, United States Naval War College.
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the case of self-defense. "There should be little doubt," he concludes
from his examination of the relevant Charter provisions, "that
unilateral, forcible self-help as an acceptable sanction in international
law has been prohibited.,,1 While it seems clear that it was the intention
of the framers to achieve just this result, they.also intended, as a quid
pro quo to states for this surrender of a portion of their sovereignty,
that the UN would take collective measures in the future to enforce
compliance with the Charter's obligations. Such measures, as everyone
knows,. rarely have been taken. Indeed, it can be said without much
overstatement that the Charter provisions in this regard have atrophied.
Ambassador Rosenne, in a generally pessimistic assessment of the
present state of the collective security concept, goes so far as to
conclude that "the original scheme has failed, and its replacement has
not yet begun to take clear shape.,,2 The latter half of this compound
sentence offers little comfort or guidance to the government planner,
much less to the naval officer faced with an on-the-spot decision.
To take as an example a situation which has occurred time and again
in the past and undoubtedly will occur with some frequency in the
future, what action can a state take to protect its nationals living in a
foreign state when their lives are endangered by a complete breakdown
of law and order in that state? Under customary international law, it
was blackletter law that a state, invoking its right of forcible self-help,
could send its navy and land its marines to protect the lives of its
citizens in such a situation. Indeed, as Commander Woods points out in
his scholarly article on the U.S. Navy Regulations covering this issue,
from 1893 onward they specifically "tasked naval officers with the
responsibility of exercising their independent judgment in the application of force to protect the lives and property of U.S. citizens on
foreign soil against actual or impending arbitrary violence...3 While the
specific provisions discussed by Woods have been deleted from the
1973 edition of the regulations-to be replaced by a somewhat opaque
admonition that "[ t] he use of force in time of peace ... is illegal
except as an act of self-defense,,4 -his and several other articles
contained in this volume contain useful analyses and helpful guidelines
for decisionmakers in this area.
If recent history is any guide, the problem of protecting nationals
abroad will be one of particular concern to the U.S. for some time. The
articles in this volume focus upon the three "classic" cases where the
U.S. has used forcible self-help and defended the legality of its actions
under international law in general and the UN Charter in specific-the

I Miller, "Collective Intervention and the Law of the Charter," page 77 of this
volume at page 81.

2Rosenne, "International Law and the Use of Force," page 1 of this volume at
page 7.
3Woods, "U.S. Navy Regulations, International Law, and the Organization of
American States," at page 16 of this volume.
4 For the full text of the applicable articles, see page xiv infra.
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landing in Lebanon in 1958, the Congo rescue operation in 1964, and
the Dominican Republic action in 1965. Since their original publication, moreover, other situations have arisen where forcible self-help
either was used or contemplated-the Mayaguez incident and the
evacuation of U.S. nationals from Iran being the most prominent
examples. Varying the fact pattern somewhat, the rash of aerial
hijackings-in which passengers are held hostage to the achievement of
political, pecuniary or personal goals-has raised the same legal issues in
a new and different context. Indeed, an examination of the Israeli raid
on Entebbe in 1976 shows how the norms discussed in several articles
in this volume have been used by the international legal community in
appraising this use of forcible self-help.
This Introduction is not the place to discuss the Entebbe raid in
detail. Interested readers will find it considered at some length in my
forthcoming monograph in the "Blue Book" Series-Forcible Self-Help
to Protect Nationals Abroad. Suffice it to say that, given the
well-known facts of Entebbe situation, nearly all commentators have
approved the Israeli rescue operation and considered it a valid exercise
of the right of forcible self-help which they consider still exists under
contemporary international law. 5 In the Security Council debate that
followed Entebbe, the U.S. once again reaffirmed its recognition of a
state's right to take forcible steps to protect its nationals abroad.
Israel's action in rescuing the hostages necessarily involved a
temporary breach of the territorial integrity of Uganda. Normally, such a breach would be impermissible under the Charter of
the United Nations. However, there is a well established right to
use limited force for the protection of one's own nationals from
the imminent threat of injury or death in a situation .where the
state in whose territory they are located is either unwilling or
unable to protect them. The right, flowing from the right of
self-defense, is limited to such use of force as is necessary and
appropriate to protect threatened nationals from injury. 6

5Green, "Rescue at Entebbe-Legal Aspects," 6 ISRAEL Y.B. HUMAN
RIGHTS 312 (1976); Knisbacher, "The Entebbe Operation: A Legal Analysis of
Israel's Rescue Action," 12 J. INT'L L. & EC. 57 (1977); Knft, "Self-Defense and
Self-Help: The Israeli Raid on Entebbe," 4 BROOKLYN J. INT'L. L. 43 (1977);
Salter, "Commando Coup at Entebbe: Humanitarian Intervention or Barbaric
Aggression?" 11 INT'L LAW. 331 (1977); and Note, "Use of Force for the
Protection of Nationals Abroad: The Entebbe Incident," 9 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L. 117 (1977). Compare Sheehan, "The Entebbe Raid: The Principle of
Self-Help in International Law As Justification for State Use of Armed Force," 1
FLETCHER FORUM 135 (1977) (recommends new concept of "rectification"),
with Paust, "Entebbe and Self-Help: The Israeli Response to Terrorism," 2
FLETCHER FORUM 86 ~1978) (urges retention of traditional concept of
self.help.

6 31 U.N. SCOR (1941st mtg.) 31, U.N. Doc. S/p.v. 1941 (1976).
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Note that this right, while stoutly defended, is described only as one
"flowing from the right of self-defense.... " Can and should it not be
·defined with more precision?
'The answer obviously is in the affirmative. A quick glance at several
of the articles in this volume provides some definitional help, more, it
must be added, than most of the legal literature on Entebbe. 7
Parenthetically, it is worth noting that this literature nowhere cites or
otherwise makes use of these articles which had appeared some years
before in the Naval War College Review. Such research oversights,
understandable in view of the fact that not all nonmilitary authors have
ready access to the Review, hopefully will occur with diminishing
frequency now that the present two volumes are in print. 'Thus the
articles discussed immediately below should have considerable impact
upon the protection of nationals debates in coming years.
Take, for instance, the previously-mentioned article by Admiral
Miller. As we have seen, contrary to the stereotype of military lawYers
held by many civilians, Miller ends his textual analysis of the impact of
the UN Charter upon the customary norms governing the protection of
nationals abroad with a conclusion which not all government decisionmakers, military or otherwise, will welcome: namely, that the Charter
prohibits forcible self-help. 8 The counterweight to this prohibition, he
proceeds to relate, is the. substitute of collective action by the UN. Yet
Miller, unlike some international lawYers who focus their eyes on the
text of the Charter almost exclusively, 9 is not unaware of the principle
that the subsequent conduct of parties to a treaty is relevant to its
interpretation. "Whether or not the charter has constructed collective
machinery adequate to [its] purpose," he rightly observes,
is quite another question and, it would seem, a most crucial one.
For if the promised substitute for unilateral action is not
forthcoming, states could hardly be expected to refrain from
developing other procedures and perhaps from even falling back
to their prior practice of unilateral forcible self-help.... It is
abundantly clear_ from current international practice that this
process has long since begun. l °
One example he cites is the Dominican Republic. While not taking a
position himself on whether the U.S.'s actions were legal or not-once
again demonstrating his independence from the official line taken by
the U.S. Government at the time-he does note that many com-

7See note 5 supra. An exception is Paust's short comment.
8See text at note 1 supra.
9 See,

e.g;,

Brownlie,

"Thoughts

on

Kind-Hearted

Gunmen,"

in

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 139 (R.
Lillich ed. 1973). Compare Brownlie, "Humanitarian Intervention," in LAW AND
CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217 (J.N. Moore ed. 1974), with Lillich,

"Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Dr. Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive
Alternatives," in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 229 (J.N.
Moore ed. 1974).
lOMiller, supra note I, at 80.
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mentators have called the initial landing of marines to protect and
evacuate U.S. nationals "a legitimate exercise of unilateral self-defense
or unilateral forcible self-help for humanitarian purposes. ,,11 Since his
article concerns the legitimacy of collective action by regional
organizations, he does not venture to define these two concepts or
clarify the criteria for their invocation.
This task is attempted with some success by Commander Woods.
While never explicitly distinguishing between the two concepts, he
repeatedly makes clear his belief that unilateral forceful action to
protect nationals abroad can be justified under contemporary internationallaw only if such action is deemed "to .be encompassed within the
concept of self-defense.,,12 Using these criteria formulated by Judge
Waldock-"(l) an imminent threat of injury to nationals, (2) a failure
or inability on the part of th~ territorial sovereignty to protect them
and (3) measures of protection strictly confined to the object of
protecting them against injury ,,1 3 -he concludes that "the original
limited intervention in the disorders of the Dominican Republic on 28
April 1965 to protect U.S. citizens from imminent danger in a situation
of anarchy did not violate standards of customary international law. ,,14
Woods claims support for this conclusion from Article 0614 of the U.S.
Navy Regulations of 1948, then in force, which under the rubric of the
"right of self-preservation" specifically authorized (and, indeed, mandated) the use of force to protect "the lives and property of [U.S.]
citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending.... "
In the best tradition of the Navy JAG, however, Commander Woods
does not accept the authoritativeness of the above article unquestionably, always a prudent approach and an especially wise one in this case
in view of the fact that the article had remained unchanged since the
late Nineteenth Century. 1 5 Reviewing it against contemporary internationallaw, he finds it no longer completely compatible and hence urges
the Navy
to update article 0614 to conform to modem stanciqrds of
customary international law. It is suggestea that this can be
accomplished by the simple expediency of deleting any reference

1 lId.

at 96.

l2 Woods, supra note 3, at 30.
l3Waldock, "The Regulation of the Use of -Force by Individual States in
Intemational Law," 81 RECUEIL DES COURS (Hague Academy of International
Law) 455, 467 (1952-II).
l4 Woods , supra note 3, at 26.
15 See text at note 3 supra. "Your present [pre-1973] Navy Regulations I was
able to trace .•• back to 1893. They are almost in haec verba now with what- they
were in 1893. Since then we have had "the Hague convention, the League of
Nations, the Kellog-Briand Pact, and the United Nations Charter. I gently
[suggest] that it might be a good idea to -reassess these sections of the Navy
Regulations to see whether they [are] in conformity with international law •... "
Lillich, "Forcible Self-Help Under International Law," page 129 of this volume
at page 133.

xiv
to "property" and substituting the words "self-defense" for the
outmoded language "self-preservation" wherever the latter
appears. Additionally, bearing in mind the serious international
consequences that an application of force could entail, it is
suggested that specific operation orders be written with a view
toward giving commanding officers definitive guidance in the
enforcement of this right, emphasizing the concept of evacuation
over all other means of protection. 1 6
His call here fell on receptive ears, for the 1973 edition of the
regulations not only shifts the juridical rationale for the use of force
from self-preservation to self-defense, but also eliminates any reference
to protecting the "property" of U.S. nationals. The new regulations
provide as follows:
0914. Violations of International Law and Treaties.
On occasions when injury to the United States or to citizens
thereof is committed or threatened in violation of the principles
of international law or in violation of rights existing under a
treaty or other international agreement, the senior officer present
shall consult with the diplomatic or consular representatives of
the United States, if possible, and he shall take such action as is
demanded by the gravity of the situation. In time of peace, action
inVOlving the use of force may be taken only in consonance with
the provisions of the succeeding article of these regulations. The
responsibility for any application of force rests wholly upon the
senior officer present. He shall report immediately all the facts to
the Secretary of the Navy.
0915. Use of Force Against Another State.
1. The use of force in time of peace by United States naval
personnel against another nation or against anyone within the
territories thereof is illegal except as an act of self-defense. The
right of self-defense may arise in order to counter either the use
of force or an immediate threat of the use of force.
2. The conditions calling for the application of the right of
self-defense cannot be precisely defined beforehand, but must be
left to the sound judgment of responsible naval personnel who are
to perform their duties in this respect with all possible care and
forebearance. The right of self-defense must be exercised only as
a last resort, and then only to the extent which is absolutely
necessary to accomplish the end required.
3. Force must never be used with a view to inflicting
punishment for acts already committed.
Like its predecessor, however, Article 0915(2) does not spell out
satisfactorily the criteria to be used in determining when force may be
used to protect U.S. nationals. Instead, on the ground that "[t]he
conditions calling for the application of the right of self-defense cannot
be precisely defined beforehand," it leaves the decision "to the sound
judgment of responsible naval personnel who are to perform their

16 Woods, supra note 3, at 30.
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duties in this respect with all possible care and forebearance." From
whence, then, is the naval commander (or operations order writer or
other decisionmaker) to get the "definitive guidance" Woods statesand everyone must agree-he needs?
Considerable help is provided by Captain McHugh in his article
"Forcible Self-Help in International Law."l 7 As his title indicates,
unlike Miller, who straddles the question, and Woods, who opts for the
self-defense theory, McHugh adopts the forcible self-help rationale to
justify the protection of U.S. nationals abroad. In this respect he joins
company not only with me, 1 8 but with Professor Myres S. McDougal,
one of the leading U.S. international lawyers of this century and the
distinguished co-author of the leading treatise on the use of force in
international law. 19 In an article in the Naval War College Review,
reprinted in Volume I, McDougal graphically demonstrates how his own
thinking on forcible self-help has shifted in light of post-Charter state
practice. The importance of his views warrants the following quotation
of unaccustomed length:
It has been argued ... that only two kinds of uses of force,
transnational force, are now authorized. One is the self-defense
that is authorized under article 51, the other is the collective
police action of the organization which is authorized in chapter
VII of the Charter. I'm ashamed to confess that at one time I lent
my support to the suggestion that article 2(4) and the related
articles did preclude the use of self-help less than self-defense. On
reflection, I think that this .was a very grave mistake, that article
2(4) and article 51 must be interpreted differently....
[T]he first important fact is that the machinery for collective
police action projected by the Charter has never been implemented. We don't have the police forces for the United Nations,
the collective machinery that was expected to replace self-help. In
other words, there has been a failure in certain of the major
provisions for implementing the Charter.
If, in the light of this failure, we consider how we can
implement the principal purposes of minimizing coercion, of
insuring that states do not profit by coercion and violence, I
submit to you that it is simply to honor lawlessness to hold that
the members of one state can, with impunity, attack the
nationals-individuals, ships, aircraft or other assets-of other
states without any fear of response. In the absence of collective
machinery to protect against attack and deprivation, I would
suggest that the principle of major purpose requires an interpretation which would honor self-help against prior unlawfulness. The
principle of subsequent conduct certainly confirms this....

17McHugh, "Forcible Self·Help in International Law," at page 139 of this
volume.
18 See note 15 supra.

19McDougal & Feliciano, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:
THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION (1961).

XVI

Hence, if I had the opportunity to rewrite the book with Mr.
Feliciano in which we mildly questioned the lawfulness of
self-help less than self-defense, I think I would come out with a
different conclusion, as many people have. 20"
While McHugh does not cite this extract in his own article, his analysis
obviously was influenced by McDougal, whose treatise he relies upon
heavily.
McHugh's primary contribution, however, is his refinement of
various criteria, which Professor Richard A. Falk first advanced 10
years ago, by which the legality of a state's claim of forcible self-help
may be judged. 21 Under these criteria, the use of force by states may
be acceptable provided:
-That acts of provocation by the target state have raised an
imminent and significant threat to the continued existence of a
nation's political independence and/or territorial integrity.
-That, if possible, a diligent effort has been made to obtain
satisfaction by pacific means.
-That recourse to international organizations is had as practicable.
-That a state accepts the burden of persuasion and makes a
prompt explanation of its conduct before the relevant organ of
community review, showing a disposition to accord respect to its
will.
-That the acting state's purpose cannot be achieved by acting
within its own territory.
-That the use of force is proportional to the provocation and
directed against military and paramilitary targets and clearly
indicates the contours of the unacceptable provocation.
-That the user of force continues to seek a pacific settlement of
the underlying dispute on reasonable terms. 22
Applying these criteria to the Dominican Republic action, McHugh
thinks the initial landings to protect and evacuate U.S. nationals pass
international muster. "It is submitted," he suggests, "that intervention
for this purpose in the future would be hard to fault.,,2 3 The
conclusions reached by the commentators on Entebbe bear him out. 24

20 McDougal, "Authority to Use Force on the High Seas," 20 NAVAL WAR
COLLEGE REV. 19, 28-29 (Dec. 1967), at page 551 of Volume I of these
reprints.
21 Falk, "The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation," 63 AM.
J. INT'L L. 415, 441-42 (1969). Other criteria, specifically formulated for the
protection of nationals context, may be found in Nanda, "The United States'
Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order-part I," 43
DENVER L.J. 439, 475 (1966); Lillich, "Forcible Self-Help to Protect Human
Rights," 53 IOWA L. REV. 325, 347-51 (1967); and Moore, "The Control of
Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict," 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 205,264 (1969).
22McHugh, supra note 17, at 154.
23 Id•

at 152.

24 See

note 5 supra.
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The several articles discussed above constitute, in my opinion, a
most valuable contribution to a topic of great complexity and
continuing importance. They have been instrumental, as has been seen,
in bringing the Navy Regulations into line with contemporary internationallaw. Moreover, they raise issues of policy and suggest criteria for
decision that will prove highly useful in coming years to policy planners
and naval officers alike. Their republication herein will assure them of
the wide audience they deserve.
International Human Rights Norms
and the U.S. Foreign Policy Process
Turning to the articles in this volume which touch upon international human rights, one is struck both by their number and the wide
range of issues they cover. Perhaps that is because under the Carter
Administration our consciences have been raised about the issue of
human rights, not only at home but also abroad. Yet the concern for
human rights, somewhat paradoxically in the view of some civilians,
always has been prominent among members of the naval profession.
Forcible self-help to protect nationals abroad, after all, is no more than
the rudimentary procedure by which states seek to protect the
substantive human rights-the most basic of which is the right to life
itself-of individuals. Human rights factors are influential if not
necessarily controlling in a host of other international law fields as well.
Professor Louis Sohn, at the outset of his article on "International Law
and Basic Human Rights," correctly states that:
[ t ] his is an area of international law in which, over the y~ars, we
developed perhaps more law than in other areas. If you look at
the jurisprudence of international tribunals, you discover that
more cases deal with problems of human rights than with rights
and duties of states themselves. 2 5
In addition to the traditional international law governing the
Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, upon which Sohn
focuses, the other major body of law concerned with human rights in
pre-Charter days was the Law of War. Few if any international laWYers
would dissent from Professor Tucker's assertion that "the traditional
law of war [was] one of the most worthwhile achievements of the 18th
and 19th centuries. _.. ,,26 Beginning just over a century ago and
culminating in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (soon to be
supplemented by the two Geneva Protocols of 1977), a vast body.of
substantive and procedural law came into. being, the purpose of which
was to regulate and humanize the conduct of armed conflict. This )lody
of law, ably canvassed by Professor Gerald Draper, 2 7 arose from the

25 Sohn, "International Law and Basic Human Rights," at page 587 of this
volume.
26Tucker, "The Law of War," at page 233 of this volume.
27Draper, "Rules Governing the Conduct of Hostilities-The Laws of War and
Their Enforcement," at page 247 of this volume.
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concern to protect, insofar as it is possible in wartime, the human rights
of individuals, whether combatants or civilians. As Judge Baxter
explains,
[ t] he reason for the application of law in this area is to be found
in a fundamental human response to warfare and human misery.
We realize that even though millions may be suffering, this offers
no justification to add one more person to that group if injury to
him can be avoided. To find the basis for this, you must go back
to the respect for human dignity and for the worth of the
individual, which is the foundation of civilization itself. 2 8
The Law of War covers a vast range of subjects, most of which
receive treatment in this volume. The articles by Baldwin, Grabb and
Hearn together comprise a comprehensive study of the Status of Forces
Agreements, a .major purpose of which is to guarantee U.S. military
personnel garrisoned abroad procedural due process should they be
tried in foreign courts. Several articles, including one by the President
of the Naval War College, Admiral Stockdale, raise legal and other issues
concerning the treatment of prisoners of war in Vietnam; of especial
interest is Commander Naughton's psychological portrait of the U.S.
POW, which describes the stresses to which they were subjected and the
creative responses by which they resisted enemy pressure. 2 9 Other
articles treat specific types of weapons and warfare (DeSaussure on air
warfare, Levie on mine warfare, and Miller on naval warfare). Professor
Levie, in a short but meaty article entitled "Combat Restraints,,,30
examines the four specific areas of military necessity, reprisals,
protection of civilian noncombatants and protection of paws. "The
problem in this area," he concludes, "is not lack of law, it is lack of
compliance with the law.,,31
Enforcing the law in this area is a problem, as it is in other areas of
international law where human rights concerns are manifest. "If the
international law of war is to accomplish anything," writes Baxter, "if
real restraints are to be placed upon violence in warfare, the wrongdoer
must be held criminally accountable for violations of the law.,,3 2 The
difficulty with following this prescription is that no international court,
as Professor Briggs' review of the Nuremberg Tribunal established after
World War II reminds us, exists to try alleged war criminals, and that
(pace Colonel Poydasheff) the use of courts-martial to try the My Lai
defendants clearly demonstrates, at least in my opinion, that the
process by which an offender is tried by his or her own military
establishment has not yet been made to "work." In view of the
well-known facts about My Lai, which led to only six prosecutions and

28 Baxter, "The Law of War," page 209 of this volume at page 212.
29Naughton, "Motivational Factors of American Prisoners of War Held by the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam," at page 379 of this volume.
30Levie, "Combat Restraints," at page 201 of this volume.

31 ld. at 207.
32 Baxter, supra note 28, at 213.
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but one conviction, that of Lieutenant Calley, who is now free on
parole, it simply "boggles the mind" to be told that "the My Lai cases,
posing the problem they did, were properly and correctly resolved by
the U.S. Army.,,33
Enforcing the Law of War by prosecuting alleged wrongdoers
presents some legal as well as administrative problems. In the forefront
are the interrelated issues of command responsibility and superior
orders. (In the My Lai cases, it will be recalled, Captain Medina argued
that he was not responsible for the crimes Calley and his men
committed since he [Medina] had no actual knowledge of their acts;
Calley, conversely, claimed that he merely was carrying out Medina's
orders and hence was not responsible himself.)
Insofar as command responsibility is concerned, military commanders obviously are responsible for war crimes when the acts in
question were committed by their men pursuant to their orders.
Moreover-and here I quote, inter alia, from Paragraph 501 of The U.S.
Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare-a commander
is also responsible if he has actual knowlege, or should have
knowledge, through reports received by him or through other
means, that troops or other persons subject to his control are
about to commit or have committed a war crime and he fails to
take the necessary and reasonable steps to insure compliance with
the law of war- or to punish violations thereof. (Emphasis added.)
The italicized phrase, which reflects the rule of broad if not absolute
command responsibility applied in the Yamashita Case,34 is a key
factor in the enforcement of the law of war since it in effect requires
affirmative action by the commander, action which if taken will reduce
the likelihood of the law's violation. The surprising failure to charge the
court members correctly in the case of Captain Medina, who was found
not guilty after a charge repeatedly emphasizing that his actual
knowledge of the acts of Calley and his men at My Lai was necessary
for conviction, constitutes a retreat from the standards of Yamashita
and Field Manual 27-10.
Joining this unfortunate retreat is Colonel Hart, whose enterprising
search intol the unpublished records of the Board of Review in
Yamashita reveals that the five army officers sitting on it clearly
thought that the evidence submitted to the Military Commission which
tried the General connected him with actual knowledge of the activities
for which he eventually paid with his life. Since, as Hart_points out,
"[t]he Military Commission failed to address the question_of knowledge explicitly,,,3 5 what he calls "the so-called Yamashita principle,,3 6

33Poydasheff, "Military Justice: A Reinforcer of Discipline," page 426 of this
volume at page 432.
34 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
35Hart, "Yamashita, Nuremberg and Vietnam: Command Responsibility
Reappraised," page 397 of this volume at page 404.
36 I d. at 412.
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emerged. In fact, he argues, it "does not exist legally.u37 This
interesting attempt to rewrite legal history seems plausible at flrst
glance, but it runs counter to what has emerged as the accepted-and
desirable-rule of command responsibility. Moreover, it clearly conflicts
with the above-quoted paragraph of Field Manual 27-10, which the
author nowhere cites.
With respect to the defense of superior orders, Paragraph 509(a) of
the Field Manual restates the accepted rule, namely, that they do not
constitute a defense in .the trial of an accused individual, unless he
did not know and could not reasonably have been expected to
know that the act ordered was unlawful.
The defense did not save Lieutenant Calley in his court-martial, as
Colonel Poydasheff explains, because the presumed order of Captain
Medina could not have been considered valid, and because "Calley
should have known that killing unarmed, unresisting men, women, and
children was illegal.u38 In my opinion, Poydasheff, in his attempt at "a
reconciliation of law and military ethics, U goes too far in favor of the
latter when he parses Calley to read that "the servicemember is bound
only to refuse patently illegal orders or those that he personally knows
are illegalu39 This gloss of Paragraph 509(a), which the author does
not cite [although he does quote in full the explanatory and seemingly
more exculpatory Paragraph 509(b)], reflects a more lenient attitude
toward the alleged wrongdoer than is desirable if a serious effort to
enforce the law of war by means of individual responsibility is to be
maintained.
Whether this approach is workable in any event is an issue raised by
Draper.
On balance I am inclined to think, after a long and somewhat
painful experience in war crimes forums, that the moral, social,
and disciplinary effects of thorough instructions in the law of war
in general, and in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in particular, ... may in the long run prove more persuasive of law
observance and dissuasive of its breach than the execution or long
imprisonment of war criminals.
. . . Instruction in the law of war and the humanitarian code of
conduct enjoined thereby, render the recipient aware that there
are permanent legal norms, based upon the moral, humane, and
rational order, which transcend municipal laws and superior
orders at variance with or denying that order. Governments which
fail to give that instruction in the law of war now required by the
law of war render their armed forces and civil population and the
entire community of civilized men and women, a gross disservice
which posterity will not fail to condemn. Governments have been
given full and adequate warning. Let them disregard it at their
peril. 40
37 Id•

38Poydasheff, supra note 33, at 434.
39Id• at 435 (emphasis added).

40Draper, supra note 27, at 261-62.

xxi
These prophetic words, written at the beginning of the Vietnam War,
unfortunately were not heeded initially and one result was My Lai.
Subsequent improvements in educating servic~men in the law of war
have been far more successful, and if contiriued and improved should
supplement if not supplant traditional methods of enforcement.
In an entirely different area, where human rights concerns once
again directly impact upon the duties and responsibilities of the naval
officer, Colonel Mann41 and Professor Goldie42 both recount the
unsuccessful attempt by a Lithuanian seaman on a Soviet ship to obtain
political asylum aboard the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Vigilant in
November 1970. Although the seaman was able to make it aboard the
cutter, a Soviet boarding party subsequently was permitted to remove
him by force. Clearly this summary denial of asylum violated the U.S.'s
obligations under the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,43
and the officers concerned paid the price in reprimands, retirements
and shore duty. Although there was no Coast Guard regulation in force
concerning the granting of asylum,44 the various persons concerned in
making the unfortunate decision would have received woefully misleading guidance from Article 0621 of the Navy Regulations of 1948,
then in force, which opened with a flatly wrong sentence stating that
"[ t] he right of asylum for political or other refugees has no foundation
in international law." Clearly, the above Protocol being the supreme
law of the land under the U.S. Constitution, Article 0621 was void,
invalid and in need of revision. Goldie's suggested revisions were
adopted almost lock, stock and barrel in Article 0940 of the 1973
edition of the regulations, 4 5 demonstrating once again the actionoriented thrust of many of the articles in this volume. 4 6
Bringing order to one's own house is a major human rights concern,
and by so doing the U.S. strengthens its hand when it comes to
asserting human rights .claims against other countries. Ambassador
Hauser, in an insightful article on "International Law and Basic Human
Rights,,,47 makes a strong plea for the U.S. to ratify the various human
rights treaties which it signed, some of which have been pending in the
Senate for over three decades. She is not particularly optimistic on this

41 Mann, Asylum Denied: The Vigilant Incident," at page 598 of this volume.
II

23

42Goldie, "Legal Aspects of the Refusal of Asylum by U.S. Coast Guard on
November 1970," at page 626 of this volume.

43protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed- Jan. 31, 1967, entered
into force Oct. 4,1967; 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
The protocol incorporates -by reference the substantive provisions of the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28,
1951, entered into force Apr. 22, 1954,189 U.N.T.S., which the U.S. had not
ratified.
44Mann, supra note 41, at 618.
45 Goldie, supra note 42, at 38-39.
46 See text at notes 15-17 supra.

47Hauser, "International Law and Basic Human Rights," at page 579 of this
volume.
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score, pointing out that "while a good number of our Senators imd it
quite correct to comment publicly on the treatment, let us say, of Jews
by the Soviets, lhos by the Nigerians, or Anguillans by the British, they
cannot accept the idea that the rest of the world would see fit to
comment on the way in which our Government treats its own
citizens. 114 8 The attitude she describes not only is logically inconsistent, but it is shortsighted as well. The U.S. has little to lose and much
to gain by supporting human rights claims both here and abroad.
Baxter, writing about respect for the law of war, makes a similar point.
"1 think you will agree with me," he states,
that one of the great objectives of the United States and of the
West in the long-range struggle in which we are engaged is the
establishment for the entire world of the rule of law. If we
ourselves do -not adhere to that standard and demand compliance
with the rule of law by those who may be arrayed against us, we
will have abandoned one of the vital objectives we are bent upon
attaining. 49
The full impact of international human rights norms on the U.S_
foreign policy process is just beginning to be felt. s 0 It is appropriate
that President Carter, a former naval officer, has been the single most
important person in bringing this situation to pass. The articles
mentioned in this volume contain a host of useful data and ideas about
the role that international law, and especially international human
rights law, can play in the shaping of a defense and foreign policy that
will protect the national security needs of the U.S. while simultaneously contributing to the development of a just and stable
international legal order.
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48 Id. at 583-84.

49 Baxter, supra note 28, at 218-19.
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